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Abstract
In capacity-then-price-setting games, soft capacity constraints are planned sales
amounts where producing above capacity is possible but more costly. While the
subgame perfect equilibrium predicts equal prices, experimental evidence often re-
veals price discrepancies. This failure to coordinate on equal prices can imply losses,
especially when serving demand is obligatory. We compare coordination failure with
efficient rationing as well as with compulsory serving of demand, and additionally
allow for simultaneous and sequential capacity choices. These treatments lead to a
varying severity of the threat of losses. Our experimental results show that (pos-
sible) coordination failure affects behavior through two channels: via anticipating
as well as via reacting to a loss. While capacities increase in anticipation of losses,
prices increase when anticipating losses but decrease after experiencing losses. Co-
ordination failures are more probable after subjects experienced a loss.
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I. Introduction
There is a vast literature on laboratory experiments analyzing collusive behavior of
competitors. However, these approaches mostly abstract from the fact that collu-
sion, e.g., coordination on higher than competitive prices, may fail as competitors
can undercut collusive prices. In markets with homogeneous goods and capacity
constraints the risk of unsuccessful price coordination is especially pronounced be-
cause differing prices can lead to a rationing of demand. Setting capacities too
low can cause losses if excess demand has to be served whereas too high capacities
can cause losses if demand is insufficient to cover the capacity-installation costs.
Capacity-then-price competition thus provides a rich setting to study how the an-
ticipation and experience of coordination failure affects market behavior. Our study
further varies the timing of capacity choices allowing for “leading by example”which
is known to stimulate coordination in experimental markets.
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have been the first to theoretically analyze a capacity-
then-price-setting game in a homogeneous market. Among others, Gu¨th (1995),
Maggi (1996), and Boccard and Wauthy (2000, 2004) loosen their interpretation
of “capacity” by allowing to sell beyond initial capacity precommitment, albeit at
higher marginal costs. Rather than a prohibitive increase of marginal costs at
the capacity limit, “soft” capacity constraints—in case of higher than anticipated
demand—allow firms to sell more than their planned sales amounts. When firms
are obliged to serve demand—possibly at higher unit costs—rationing, demand
spillovers, and mixed strategies can be avoided. In a setup with soft capacity con-
straints and sellers’ obligation to serve demand, too low prices can force sellers to
sell more than planned, whereas too high prices can leave them with no demand to
cover sunk capacity installation costs. Both types of coordination failures imply a
“threat of losses.”
In the context of capacity-then-price-setting games, simultaneous versus sequential
capacity choices has been found to enhance collusion. Huck et al. (2001) compare
simultaneous versus sequential quantity competition and also distinguish between
random-strangers and partners-matching. Only for partners-matching both, simul-
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taneous and sequential quantity competition, do induce collusion, there are no col-
lusion effects for random-strangers-matching. Regarding the substantial behavioral
impact of loss avoidance, other studies report that participants prefer even more
risky strategies with the potential to avoid losses over those which trigger losses
with certainty (see, e.g., Rydval and Ortmann, 2005; Feltovich et al., 2012; Cachon
and Camerer, 1996; Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1991).
Our approach differs from these contributions in several ways: in capacity-then-price
competition based on fixed pair matching, participants either simultaneously or se-
quentially choose capacities before simultaneously setting prices. To vary the threat
of losses imposed by coordination failure, participants either confront efficient ra-
tioning or compulsory serving of excess demand (based on soft capacity constraints).
While these conditions are implemented between-subjects, additionally“cheap talk”
or “no communication” after capacity but before price choices is implemented as a
within-subjects variation. However, as cheap talk as such does not affect the threat
of losses, we focus only on the data of conditions without cheap talk in the following
(for an analysis of cheap talk versus no communication see Gu¨th et al., 2018). The
considered variations allow for a thorough analysis of possibly path-dependent price
and capacity choices in multi-stage games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II. analyzes the theoretical
model and derives the benchmark hypotheses. Section III. introduces the experi-
mental design. Section IV. describes and analyzes the data and discusses the results.
Section V. concludes.
II. The theoretical benchmark model
We consider a two-stage capacity-then-price-setting game with two firms i = 1, 2
installing capacities q¯i, indicating how much they intend to produce and sell. For
demand amounts qi not exceeding these levels, the constant unit cost of installing
capacity are cK and the constant unit cost of production are cP . When demand
exceeds these planned levels, firms can expand their supply, but only at an additional
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unit cost ϑ ≥ 0.1 Thus, total unit costs amount to
c˜ =


c if qi ≤ qi
c+ ϑ if qi > qi ,
where c ≡ cP + cK .
2 We restrict our analysis to a homogeneous market with the
linear demand function
D(p) = α− p ,
where α(> c+ ϑ) indicates market size.
We distinguish two basic scenarios: (i) Efficient rationing. Rationing is efficient and
the additional cost of a subsequent increase in capacity is prohibitively high, i.e.,
capacity constraints are binding and demand above capacity is not served. In case
of differing prices, the firm setting the lower price thus serves demand only up to
its capacity, whereas the firm setting the higher price serves residual demand at its
higher price. (ii) Compulsory serving of excess demand. Excess demand must be
served so that the firm charging the lower price has to satisfy all demand at its price
which may likely imply producing and selling above capacity. Correspondingly, the
firm setting the higher price sells nothing. Based on these equilibrium prices for
both scenarios, we will discuss the causes and consequences of coordination failure
in more detail.
The theoretical benchmark solutions prove to be the same for both scenarios: de-
pending on the sequentiality of the decision process, either the Cournot (1838) or
the Stackelberg (1934) solution is implied by the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
capacity-then-price-setting game. For the market clearing prices p∗ = α − qi − qj ,
the reduced-form profit functions in the first stage are
pii = (α− qi − qj − c)qi ; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j .
1As an alternative approach, Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2014) consider the case of a convex
short-term cost function leading to soft capacity constraints and tacit collusion.
2Abbink and Brandts (2008) as well as Andersson et al. (2014) use another framework and
study pricing behavior in case of increasing marginal costs.
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The profit maximizing capacities depend on the rules of the game.
Efficient rationing
Efficient rationing means that the most eager consumers are served first. When the
competitor j has installed a capacity q¯j , the residual demand for firm i is given by
Di(pi) =


α− pi − q¯j if pi ≥ pj
α− pi if pi < pj .
In the second stage of the game, given the capacities q¯1 and q¯2, the market clearing
prices p∗ = α− q¯1 − q¯2 constitute a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) if no firm
can do better by unilaterally deviating. A price cut to p < p∗ leads to a lower profit
if the reduced price is lower than the total unit cost c˜ = c + ϑ after a subsequent
capacity expansion, i.e.,
(1) p < c+ ϑ
A price increase to p > p∗ leads to a lower profit pii = pi(α−pi−q¯j) if ∂pi
i/∂pi
∣∣
pi=p∗
=
α− 2p∗ − q¯i + q¯j ≤ 0, i.e.
(2) 2q¯i + q¯j ≤ α
for i = 1, 2, j 6= i. Given that p∗ = α− q¯1− q¯2 is an equilibrium in the second stage,
the reduced-form profit functions in the first stage read pii = (α− q¯i − q¯j − c)q¯i.
We distinguish between simultaneous and sequential capacity choices.
Simultaneous capacity choices: Maximizing these profit functions with respect
to the capacities leads to the equilibrium capacities
(3) q¯c = (α− c)/3
which coincide with the Cournot quantities. In the second stage, both firms set the
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prices
(4) pc = c+ (α− c)/3
and realize the profits
(5) pic = (α− c)2/9.
Equation 3 shows that condition 2 is generally satisfied in equilibrium. Equation 4
shows that condition 1 is satisfied if ϑ > (α − c)/3. The parameter values in our
experiment, α = 200, c = 80, and ϑ = 40 satisfy this equilibrium condition.3 The
market outcome for this parameter constellation is q¯C = 40 and pC = 120.
Sequential capacity choices: The sequential capacity setting features one firm
as the leader L who first determines his capacity q¯L, which can be observed by the
follower F who then chooses his capacity q¯F second. As will be shown, in the third
stage of the game, the prices pS = α − qL − qF prove to be equilibrium prices.
Therefore, in the second stage the follower maximizes his profits
piF = (α− qL − qF − c)qF
by setting qF = (α − c − qL)/2. Anticipating this reaction, in the first stage, the
leader maximizes his profit
piL = (α− c− qL)qL/2
by choosing qL = (α− c)/2. The follower reacts according to qF = (α− c)/4, such
that the prices, independently charged by both of the firms, are
pS = c+ (α− c)/4 ,
leading to the profits
piL =(α− c)2/8
3In case of ϑ < (α− c)/3, the equilibrium prices are p = c+ ϑ.
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and
piF =(α− c)2/16 ,
respectively. In order for prices pS to be subgame perfect, firms must not gain by
unilaterally deviating. There is no incentive for a firm to undercut pS if the marginal
cost of producing additional units, c+ ϑ > pS , is higher than pS = (α+ 3c)/4, i.e.,
ϑ > (α− c)/4 .(6)
Let us now derive the condition where efficient rationing does not induce a firm to
raise the price above pS . In the final stage of the game, firm i’s (net) profit from
setting a price pi ≥ p
S is
pii = (pi − cP )(α− pi − qj) .
Its derivative at pi = p
S ,
α− 2pS − qj + cP ,
has to be non-positive for pS to qualify as an equilibrium price. Obviously, the
more restrictive case for this critical condition is that j = F , i.e., the leader i = L
deviates. Therefore, the price pS constitutes an equilibrium if α−2pS−qF +cP ≤ 0
is satisfied. Substituting for pS = (α + 3c)/4 and qF = (α − c)/4 and taking into
account that c = cK + cP this implies the condition
α− 5cK − cP ≤ 0 .(7)
The parameter values in the experiment, α = 200, cK = 80, cP = 0, and ϑ = 40
satisfy the equilibrium conditions (6) and (7). The market outcome for this param-
eter constellation is q¯L = 60, q¯F = 30, and pS = 110.
Compared to the simultaneous game, sequential capacity choices lead to higher
total capacities (q¯L + q¯F = 3(α − c)/4 > 2q¯
c = 2(α − c)/3) and lower prices
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(pS = c+ (α − c)/4 < pc = c+ (α − c)/3), i.e., sequentiality of capacity choices is
more competitive.
Collusion, in the sense of both sellers sharing the monopoly profit, implies q¯1 =
q¯2 = q¯
K = 30 and p1 = p2 = p
K = 140 when sharing equally. We will view lower
total capacities and higher prices as an indicator of collusive behavior.
Compulsory serving of excess demand
If firms have to serve excess demand, for instance, since the cost of turning down
customers is very high, the equilibrium outcomes continue to apply. There is no
incentive for a firm to charge a price higher than the equilibrium price because this
would result in no demand at all. In case of a unilateral price reduction, the as-
sumption ϑ ≥ (α− c)/3 implies that the unit cost of producing above the planned
capacity (c+ ϑ) is higher than any price p ≤ pC so that any price reduction below
pC or pS is unprofitable, regardless whether capacity decisions are simultaneous or
sequential. Therefore, for the parameter values used in our experiment, the unique
subgame perfect equilibria are the same as in the case of efficient rationing.
We thus state
Hypothesis 1 Sequentiality of capacity choices induces fiercer competition, i.e.,
higher total capacities and lower prices.
Coordination failure: In the theoretical benchmark model, there are no ratio-
nal incentives for different capacity or price choices in case of efficient rationing or
compulsory serving. However, compulsory serving easily leads to losses if subjects
fail to coordinate on the same price as this distributes demand unequally between
them. With unequal prices and compulsory serving, the one with the lower price
has to serve the entire demand. If demand exceeds capacity, this means producing
above capacity at a higher cost. The seller with the higher price, in turn, faces no
demand at all and earns nothing to cover (sunk) capacity installation cost. With
efficient rationing, the failure to coordinate prices bears a weaker threat of losses:
The seller with the lower price has to serve demand only up to his capacity limit.
The seller with the higher price, however, has to fear that residual demand is in-
sufficient to cover capacity installation cost. The threat of losses is thus stronger
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with compulsory serving as compared to efficient rationing which might affect the
behavior of participants in different ways.
In the capacity-then-price-setting game, the two potential causes for a loss are thus
excess demand and insufficient demand. In case of failure to coordinate prices,
excess demand results for the subject with the lower price, whereas demand is
insufficient for the subject with the higher price. In the experiment, we can identify
which type of coordination failure causes a loss. Thus, we can investigate whether
subjects react differently to the loss type they have experienced. Experimental
studies show that experiencing losses induces attempts to subsequently avoid (or
reduce the risk for) them (see, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Cachon and
Camerer, 1996; Feltovich et al., 2012).4 In our experiment, loss avoiding strategies
could induce subjects, who experienced excess demand, to increase capacities to
mitigate the risk of excess demand, or they could induce subjects to increase their
prices to avoid having the lower price. This would be in line with the literature
suggesting more risky behavior after a loss (see, e.g., Cachon and Camerer, 1996)
as a larger capacity and higher price could avoid the loss which would result from
playing it safe, i.e., choosing a low capacity but a high price. Behaviorally this
suggests
Hypothesis 2 Experiencing a loss, caused by excess demand, induces higher ca-
pacities as well as higher prices.
However, subjects who experienced insufficient demand could decrease capacities
to reduce capacity installation cost and decrease prices to avoid having the higher
price. This loss avoiding strategy gives us our second behavioral hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 Experiencing a loss, caused by no, or insufficient demand, induces
lower capacities as well as lower prices.
In case of failed coordination one out of a pair has the too high and the other the
too low price, i.e., price reactions to avoid future losses move in opposite directions.
If, e.g., the experience of a loss caused by no or insufficient demand induces the
subject with the too high price to decrease his price, the other subject—who has a
too low price and possibly experienced a loss caused by excessive demand—increases
4There is, however, also evidence that previous losses trigger more risk taking if the risky
alternatives can eliminate the loss, see, e.g., Thaler and Johnson (1990).
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his price, coordination failure would become more probable. Such a scenario would
prevail if the above hypotheses for the case of compulsory serving hold: if coor-
dination failure leads to excessive demand for the subject with the too low price
and to no demand at all for the subject with the too high price. Then past loss
experiences would make future coordination failures more likely. The same is true
in the treatments with efficient rationing where failed coordination leaves one out
of a pair facing insufficient demand due to his price being too high. If he reacts
by lowering his price, as predicted, where the other would not change his price,
coordination again becomes less probable. Summarizing we state
Hypothesis 4 Experiencing a loss increases the probability of failures to coordinate
prices.
III. Experimental design
Capacity choices are usually observable in terms of factory size, number of pro-
duction and assembly lines, etc. Therefore it is realistic to assume that capacity
choices become publicly known. As analyzed above, capacity choices in the experi-
ment may be independent (IC) or sequential (SC). A second condition distinguishes
efficient rationing (R) and compulsory serving (CS). While treatments R and CS
are implemented between subjects, the (im)possibility of price messages is varied
within-subjects via distinguishing
(M) price messages after capacity and before price choices: Each seller i = 1, 2
sends a non-binding message (containing only a number) about his choice pi,
then both sellers, after simultaneously receiving the other’s price message,
choose their sales prices, p1 and p2; and
(N) no message exchange.
Only the order of M and N is varied between subjects referred to as M-N and N-
M treatments with the obvious interpretation. Thus altogether eight treatments
(k, l,m) with k ∈ {R,CS}, l ∈ {IC, SC} and m ∈ {M-N,N-M} (see Table 1) are
implemented “between subjects” in a 2x2x2-factorial design: IC versus SC, R versus
CS, and M-N versus N-M.
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Table 1: The eight treatments
Independent capacity (IC) sequential capacity (SC)
Efficient rationing (R) M-N M-N
N-M N-M
Compulsory serving (CS) M-N M-N
N-M N-M
These treatments are implemented as finitely repeated games: The same pair of
participants stayed together for only four rounds of the capacity-then-price setting
game being aware of the number of rounds.5 This allows for cooperation via low
capacities as well as high sales prices, in the M-case via communication, and, addi-
tionally, in the treatments with sequential capacity choices via“leading by example.”
Rather than implementing long-finite horizon games with the same partner, we suc-
cessively ran three repeated games of four rounds each based on matching groups
with four participants of which two are newly matched per game, i.e., in condition
M or N one successively confronts the three other participants in one’s matching
group and interacts with each of them across four rounds.6 Altogether, participants
played 24 rounds of the capacity-then-price setting game, consisting of two 12-round
phases covering the within-subjects variation m ∈ {M-N,N-M}, see Table 1.
In the SC conditions a repeated game began with an initial random role assignment
of being the first or second mover in capacity choice.7 To ensure that participants
thoroughly understood the experimental tasks, all sessions began with control ques-
tions and a trial round.8 Unlike Anderhub et al. (2003), we have refrained from
implementing more rounds of pricing (sub)games for constant but endogenously se-
lected capacity constellations. Our reason for doing so is that we were interested in
5Since each round is composed of at least two stages, there are more interactions than rounds.
6We formed new matching groups when moving from condition M (N) to N (M).
7We did not try to influence how often a participant in the SC-conditions encounters the two
roles but let it be decided randomly for each pair. We expect no differences in behavior when
being first or second in capacity choices more often.
8In the trial round, participants played against a “robot” programmed to choose benchmark
capacities and prices. This could imply an implicit demand effect to behave as theoretically
predicted. However, we very rarely observe benchmark play in the experimental data. In the SC
treatments, participants played one trial round in the role of the leader and one in the role of
the follower (in view of the richer stage structure more familiarity with the experimental scenario
seemed advisable).
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“capacity constellation and price vector” data to distinguish how different capacity
constellations affect prices without confounding learning and reputation dynamics.
Throughout the experiment, payoffs were calculated in Experimental Currency
Units (ECU) converted into euro at a given and known exchange rate (10,000 ECU=
1 euro). In addition to their show-up fee of 15 euros, participants were paid for 10
random rounds (5 from each of the two phases) and received the reward for a lot-
tery question in the post experimental questionnaire on risk tolerance (see Holt
and Laury, 2002).9 The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
We ran 16 sessions in total, two for each treatment, 15 with 32, and one with 28,
participants, all students attending a German university. As we consider only N-
conditions in this paper, i.e., only the between-subjects variations, this gives us 508
participants making 12 capacity and 12 price decisions each.
On average, sessions lasted about 108 minutes, and payments to participants amounted,
on average, to 17.41 euros and ranged from 12.80 to 20.30 euros.
IV. Experimental results
Descriptive evidence
For the descriptive evaluation of our results we cluster our experimental data at
the matching group level.10 Figure 1 depicts the chosen, as well as the benchmark,
capacity-price pairs in the four treatments without price messages. Evidently—as
expected—the relationship between prices and capacities is negative, i.e., partici-
pants understood the basic intuition that lower capacities allow for higher prices.
Overall, actual behavior differs from the benchmark: only 3.09% of decisions in
the N treatments lie within a 10% range of the predicted capacity-price pairs. In
the treatments with compulsory serving (CS) capacity-price pairs move south-east,
9Pilot sessions showed that some participants accumulated substantial losses which we neither
wanted them to pay out-of-pocket nor to work off by clerical work. In our view, such accumulated
losses are not a result of poor understanding, but rely on questionable heuristics such as being
able to dominate the market by choosing a large capacity.
10Participants could exit the market when overburdened with the experimental task. As such
choices are not the focus of our analysis we exclude them from our sample. Dropouts in the N-
condition amount to 1.8% of all 3072 decisions made in the R and 32.9% of all 3024 decisions made
in the CS condition. The striking difference in dropout rates can be explained by the substantially
higher risk in treatment CS. The fact that less decisions were made in the CS condition is caused
by one out of four sessions consisting of only 28 participants.
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Figure 1: Capacity-then-price choices and benchmark results in the N treatments
i.e., participants in fear of negative payoffs choose higher capacities in combination
with lower prices to mitigate the risk of selling above capacity. Excluding the CS
treatments, the percentage of decisions within a 10% range of the predicted values
increases to 5%, suggesting that the threat of losses plays a substantial role.11
Regarding Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, we are interested in coordination failures leading
to losses. Table 2 shows the percentage of price coordination failures: unequal
prices lead to losses relative to all price vectors. As expected, we observe a higher
percentage of losses caused by coordination failure (between 77.9% and 78.0%)
in treatments with compulsory serving than in treatments with efficient rationing
(between 45.3% and 46.9%).
Table 2: Percentage of price coordination failures leading to losses relative to all
price decisions in condition N
Independent capacities sequential capacities
Efficient rationing 46.9 45.3
Compulsory serving 77.9 78.0
A more differentiated view on the development of coordination failures over time
11By interpreting an ǫ-range around equilibrium values as “optimal” we follow Radner (1980).
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shows that experience plays a decisive role: if the N-condition is implemented in the
first phase of the experiment (rounds 1-12), the percentage of coordination failures in
treatments with and without compulsory serving (CS) converges over time, whereas
if the N-condition is implemented in the second phase of the experiment (rounds 12-
24), coordination failures clearly occur more often in treatments with compulsory
serving. Thus, experienced subjects react differently to the high threat of losses
imposed by the CS-treatment: not only do they have a better understanding of the
consequences of failed coordination due to their experience of repeatedly playing the
game, but they also have possibly endured more losses than inexperienced subjects.
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Figure 2: Coordination failures over time
Our hypotheses regarding the effects of loss experience propose that different causes
for a loss, i.e., excess, insufficient, or no demand, trigger different loss-preventing
strategies. Figure 3 depicts all cases of price coordination failures leading to a loss,
distinguishing the type of coordination failure that caused the loss, i.e., a too high
or too low price. The percentages are calculated with respect to the overall number
of coordination failures leading to a loss in the respective treatment.12
12Note that losses also occurred in cases with successful price coordination. With respect to the
overall number of price choices leading to a loss these amount to 4.4% in treatment R.IC, 5.7% in
treatment R.SC, 7.8% in treatment CS.IC, and 6.8% in treatment CS.SC.
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Figure 3: Percentages of coordination failures leading to a loss relative to all coor-
dination failures leading to a loss in the respective treatment
Evidently, in most cases a too high price led to a loss. Distinguishing conditions,
we observe a very high percentage of high-price coordination failures for efficient ra-
tioning (around 94%) and a fairly high percentage for compulsory serving (between
58.5% and 60.0%), whereas there is hardly any difference for the other between-
subjects variation, independent versus sequential capacity choices (see Figure 3).
Recall that a too high price in the condition with compulsory serving leads to
no demand, whereas in the condition with efficient rationing it (possibly) leads to
insufficient demand. A too low price, however, can lead to excess demand with
compulsory serving and has no consequence in case of efficient rationing. This ex-
plains the extremely high percentage of cases where a too high price caused a loss,
along with the very low percentage of cases where a too low price caused a loss in
treatments with efficient rationing. In treatments with compulsory serving, causes
for a loss are more heterogeneous: a higher percentage of cases is caused by too
high prices (between 58.5% and 60.0%), i.e., no demand, as compared to too low
prices (around 33%), i.e., excess demand. These descriptive results will be tested
empirically below.
Test of Hypotheses
For the econometric evaluation of our experimental data, the between-subjects vari-
ations are evaluated using ordinary least square (OLS) models. We account for the
problem of non-independent observations by clustering standard errors at the mat-
ching group level. Given that 508 subjects made capacity and price decisions in 12
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subsequent rounds, observations amount to 2028 for the CS-treatment and to 3016
for the R-treatment, after deleting dropouts (see Footnote 10).
Hypothesis 1 proposes that treatments with sequential capacity choices (SC) lead
to fiercer competition, i.e., higher capacities (q¯own, q¯other) and lower prices (p¯own,
p¯other). We evaluate this effect controlling for the between-subjects variation effi-
cient rationing versus compulsory serving (CS), for competition experience (Exp),
for the final round fRound, and the game. As subjects interacted in six games lasting
four rounds each, i.e., fRound controls for endgame effects, whereas game (varying
from 1 to 6) controls for effects of learning to play repeated games. Subjects have
competition experience (Exp) whenever the N-condition is introduced in the second
phase of the experiment, i.e., subjects have already experienced 12 rounds of the
capacity-then-price-setting game. We additionally include the lagged capacity deci-
sion (q¯own(t− 1)) and the lagged competitor’s capacity decision (q¯other(t− 1)) and
test whether leader and follower behavior differs for the treatments with sequential
capacity choices by including a leader dummy. As Hypothesis 1 refers to capacities
and prices, we estimate a model with capacities and one with prices as the dependent
variable. For the estimation of prices, we include lagged price choices. Estimation
results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 where the right columns report results for the
subsample with sequential capacity choices. Due to the inclusion of lagged variables
the number of observations is reduced to 4423 for the complete sample (left column)
and to 2216 for the subsample of the SC-treatment (right column). Standard errors
are clustered at the matching group level.
For both, capacity and price choices, Tables 3 and 4 report a significantly positive
correlation between prior and present choices. A higher capacity (price) in t − 1
triggers a higher capacity (price) in t. Prior choices of the competitor have the same
effects on the own present choice. This indicates that over time choices move in the
same direction: a high capacity of the competitor in t − 1 leads to a significantly
higher capacity choice in t, and a high price of the competitor in t − 1 leads to a
significantly higher price choice in t.
While compulsory serving has a significantly positive effect on capacities and prices
(which we will discuss in detail below), capacities and prices in treatments with
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Table 3: Effect of sequentiality (SC) on capacity choices
Capacities
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
q¯own(t− 1) 0.419
∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.452∗∗∗ (0.035)
q¯other(t− 1) 0.097
∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.098∗∗∗ (0.023)
SC 0.044 (1.012)
Leader 2.096∗∗ (0.859)
CS 12.166∗∗∗ (1.336) 10.006∗∗∗ (1.808)
Exp -0.503 (1.483) -1.060 (2.101)
fRound -1.660∗ (0.928) -3.292∗∗ (1.396)
Game -0.522 (0.325) -0.445 (0.435)
Constant 28.183∗∗∗ (2.695) 25.671∗∗∗ (3.962)
Observations 4423 2216
R2 0.36 0.356
Sample used all treatments SC, CS, R treatment
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at matching group level
sequential capacity choices (SC) are not significantly different from those in treat-
ments with simultaneous capacity choices. When including only the subsample of
sequential capacity choices, we observe that leaders choose significantly higher ca-
pacities than followers, i.e., the leader -dummy has a significantly positive effect (see
right hand column in Table 3). This effect, however, does not carry over to price
choices (see right hand column in Table 4). Thus, while our experimental data does
not directly support Hypothesis 1, we find evidence for an intention of leaders to
induce a fiercer competition via higher capacities which is in line with Hypothesis 1.
We state
Result 1 Leaders choose significantly higher capacities than followers.
Our control variable for endgame effects (fRound) has a significantly negative im-
pact indicating that subjects choose lower prices and capacities in the final round
of interacting with the same partner.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 propose that the consequences of past choices, i.e., a resulting
profit or loss, affect present choices. The effects of compulsory serving compared to
efficient rationing are accounted for by evaluating subsamples with either condition
separately, i.e., CS = 0 and CS = 1.
Coordination failure results if subjects choose differing prices. The extent of the
price difference, however, is not decisive for the consequence of a coordination failure
which is either excess or insufficient demand. Chosen prices, not the difference
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Table 4: Effect of sequentiality (SC) on price choices
Prices
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
q¯own -0.448
∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.376∗∗∗ (0.031)
q¯other -0.154
∗∗∗ (0.018) -0.157∗∗∗ (0.023)
pown(t− 1) 0.162
∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.183∗∗∗ (0.029)
pother(t− 1) 0.062
∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.072∗∗∗ (0.023)
SC 0.016 (0.912)
Leader -0.123 (0.675)
CS 10.338∗∗∗ (1.391) 5.751∗∗∗ (1.346)
Exp 1.368 (1.359) 1.348 (1.707)
fRound -1.390∗∗ (0.607) -1.257 (0.917)
Game -0.385 (0.357) -0.722 (0.456)
Constant 113.822∗∗∗ (4.172) 109.012∗∗∗ (6.449)
Observations 4423 2216
R2 0.335 0.339
Sample used all treatments SC, CS, R treatment
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at matching group level
between them, determine whether the resulting revenue, if any, is sufficient to cover
capacity installation cost. The regression includes price choices of the prior period,
pown(t− 1) and pother(t− 1). For all coordination failures resulting in a loss in the
prior period, we create dummy variables for the two types of coordination failure:
too low p indicating that a too low price led to a loss, pown(t − 1) < pother(t − 1),
and too high p indicating a too high price led to a loss, pown(t− 1) > pother(t− 1).
As control variables we further include own and other’s capacity decisions, endgame
effects (fRound), and experience in playing repeated games (game). Due to the
inclusion of lagged variables the number of observations is reduced to 2852 for
the subsample with efficient rationing (left column) and to 1571 for the subsample
with compulsory serving (right column). Estimation results with price choices as
dependent variable are reported in Table 5. Estimation results for capacities as
dependent variable are reported in the Appendix.
Capacities, lagged price choices, and the control variable for endgame effects, display
the same significant effects as discussed above. Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive
effect of experiencing a coordination failure caused by a too low price. As a too
low price affects demand only for the condition with compulsory serving, this type
of coordination failure should have an effect for this condition only. Estimation
results reveal that a too low price in the prior period has no effect on prices, other
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Table 5: Effect of price coordination failures on price choices
CS= 0 CS= 1
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
q¯own -0.427
∗∗∗ (0.029) -0.502∗∗∗ (0.053)
q¯other -0.228
∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.049∗ (0.029)
pown(t− 1) 0.172
∗∗∗ (0.030) 0.142∗∗∗ (0.036)
pother(t− 1) 0.050
∗∗ (0.025) 0.066∗∗ (0.028)
Too high p -0.755 (0.863) -2.469∗∗ (1.180)
Too low p -19.598 (12.056) -1.640 (1.682)
Exp 0.485 (1.581) 2.874 (2.380)
fRound -1.603∗∗ (0.710) -1.125 (1.117)
Game -0.552 (0.376) -0.281 (0.748)
Constant 117.394∗∗∗ (5.292) 123.780∗∗∗ (7.389)
Observations 2852 1571
R2 0.333 0.349
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at matching group level
Includes SC, IC, CS, and R treatment
than predicted. We also find no significant effects of price coordination failure on
capacities (see Appendix). However, the results in Table 3 indicate a very strong and
significantly positive effect of the dummy compulsory serving on capacities. This
indicates that the mere threat of losses caused by a too low price and the resulting
excess demand is sufficient to induce subjects to install significantly higher capacities
than in treatments with efficient rationing. This strong treatment effect can explain
why we see no effect of coordination failures on capacities. We state
Result 2 The threat of having to serve excess demand induces higher capacities.
Regarding prices, Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative effect of experiencing a coordi-
nation failure caused by a too high price. As a too high price affects demand in the
condition compulsory serving (no demand) and in the condition efficient rationing
(insufficient demand) this type of coordination failure could have an effect for both
conditions. However, estimation results only partly support this: a too high price
in the prior period leads to a significantly lower price in the present period only for
the CS-treatment where a too high price leads to no demand at all. Thus, subjects
who experienced a loss caused by no demand choose lower prices to prevent having
a too high price in the present period. We conclude
Result 3 Experiencing a loss due to no demand induces lower prices.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that experiencing a loss increases the probability of a coordi-
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nation failure. To test this, we run a probit estimation with the dummy fail as the
dependent variable taking unit value whenever a pair failed to coordinate prices.
Explanatory variables are past loss experiences either caused by a too low or a too
high price. Additionally we control for capacity decisions, past price choices, the
SC-treatment, competition experience (exp), endgame effects (fRound), and learn-
ing (game). Note that the number of observations is reduced to 2852 for CS = 0
and 1571 for CS = 1 due to the inclusion of lagged variables. Estimation results
are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Probability of coordination failures
CS= 0 CS= 1
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
Too high p(t− 1) 0.292∗∗∗ (0.094) 0.245∗∗ (0.122)
Too low p(t− 1) 0.351∗∗∗ (0.130)
q¯own 0.002 (0.002) 0.004
∗∗ (0.002)
q¯other 0.002 (0.002) 0.003
∗ (0.002)
pown(t− 1) -0.007
∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
pother(t− 1) 0.001 (0.002) 0.005
∗∗ (0.002)
SC -0.261∗∗∗ (0.101) -0.037 (0.122)
Exp -0.415∗∗ (0.169) -0.138 (0.261)
fRound -0.077 (0.081) 0.178 (0.137)
Game 0.023 (0.048) -0.040 (0.088)
Constant 1.289∗∗∗ (0.339) -0.155 (0.565)
Observations 2852 1571
Log-likelihood -1041.594 -435.749
χ2(9) 36.152 32.442
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at matching group level
Includes SC, IC, CS, and R treatment
As predicted, coordination failure is significantly more probable if subjects expe-
rienced losses in the past. The strongest effect is caused by a too low price in
the CS-treatment which results in excessive demand. Subjects who experienced
excessive demand resulting in a loss, face a 35% higher probability that price coor-
dination will fail again in the subsequent period. This is followed by losses caused
by no demand in the R-treatment causing a 29% higher probability of coordination
failure. Finally, subjects who experienced insufficient demand in the CS-treatment
face a 24% higher probability that coordination will fail again. We summarize these
results in
Result 4 Loss experience increases the probability of failures to coordinate prices.
20
Concerning our control variables we find rather weak effects of capacity and past
price decisions, but a strong treatment effect of sequential capacity decisions (SC) as
well as a significantly negative effect of competition experience. Sequential capacity
decisions seem to simplify price coordination through the possibility of “leading by
example” whereas competition experience helps subjects to coordinate prices.
V. Conclusion
We have theoretically and experimentally explored capacity-then-price setting games
via letting fixed pairs of participants play four rounds of either simultaneously or se-
quentially choosing capacities before simultaneously determining their sales prices.
This setting allowed us to identify the type of coordination failure causing a loss,
too low or too high a price. Depending on the treatment of serving demand, i.e.,
whether the seller with the lower price has to serve the entire demand or not, co-
ordination failures have more or less severe consequences. In case of “compulsory
serving” too low prices can induce excess demand whereas too high prices yield no
demand. In the experiment, the latter type of coordination failure more often led
to losses than too low prices. Further, “compulsory serving”via its threat of having
to serve excess demand induced larger capacities to an extent that no experience
effects of losses are visible. Prices, however, react to the loss experiences caused by
too high prices (no demand) which let subjects decrease their sales prices.
With efficient rationing, coordination failures had less severe consequences: too low
prices hardly ever led to a loss as one had to sell only up to the capacity limit,
whereas too high prices with insufficient demand almost always led to a loss. Loss
avoiding strategies thus induced path-dependent pricing behavior only in case of
compulsory serving: experiencing a loss caused by no demand let subjects lower
their prices. However, the positive treatment effect of compulsory serving indicates
that the anticipation of a possible loss induces subjects to choose higher prices
than in treatments with efficient rationing. Altogether prices are affected through
two channels: via anticipating possible losses as well as via reacting to past losses,
whereas capacities are affected so substantially by the anticipation of losses that
loss experience becomes insignificant. Overall, the probability that coordination of
prices fails increases with the experience of losses.
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Our findings shed new light on how loss experiences affect market behavior. In line
with earlier work identifying a “rationalizing”effect of losses (Cachon and Camerer,
1996; Feltovich et al., 2012) participants, confronting (a risk of) losses, prefer “safe”
over“risky”strategies when their choices are restricted to these options. Our setting
adds to this observation via offering participants other loss-avoiding (risk-reducing)
strategies, namely more collusive or more competitive capacity as well as price
choices.
It is striking that participants mainly react to loss experiences by safer strategies
and not by risky attempts to recover their previous losses, unlike reported by (ex-
perimental) studies inspired by prospect theory (see, for instance, Laury and Holt,
2008). This can be due to the fact that in our experimental scenarios risk reduction
is costly and therefore associated with lower profits. For example, while lower prices
on the one hand avoid being restricted to residual or even no demand, on the other
hand they reduce total profits. Similarly, higher capacities avoid compulsory serving
above capacity limits but increase sunk capacity costs and thereby also reduce total
profits. It thus seems that in richer strategic settings some of the stylized results,
based on (experimental) evidence from studies of individual decision making, may
become debatable. However, more research is needed before reaching sound conclu-
sions on how multiplicity of loss avoiding strategies with varying costs affects risky
decision making in market contexts.
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Appendix
Table 7: Effect of price coordination failures on capacity choices
CS= 0 CS= 1
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.) Coeff. (Std. Err.)
q¯own(t− 1) 0.432
∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.448∗∗∗ (0.050)
q¯other(t− 1) 0.065
∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.217∗∗∗ (0.029)
pown(t− 1) 0.068
∗∗ (0.029) 0.044 (0.051)
pother(t− 1) -0.034 (0.023) 0.143
∗∗∗ (0.031)
Too high p -0.934 (1.016) 0.098 (1.371)
Too low p 2.569 (13.159) 1.843 (1.869)
Exp -0.237 (1.978) -1.779 (2.113)
fRound -1.202 (1.034) -2.238 (1.753)
Game -1.134∗∗∗ (0.410) 0.455 (0.486)
Constant 28.365∗∗∗ (5.233) 6.339 (8.425)
Observations 2852 1571
R2 0.209 0.237
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at matching group level
Includes SC, IC, CS, and R treatment
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Instructions for treatment IC.R.N-M, conditions SC and CS in parentheses
General information
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain silent and turn off
your mobile phones. Please read the instructions carefully and note that they are
identical for each participant. During the experiment it is forbidden to talk to other
participants. In case you do not follow these rules, we will have to exclude you from
the experiment as well as from any payment.
You will receive 15 euros for participating in this experiment. The participation fee
and any additional amount of money you will earn during the experiment will be
paid out to you privately in cash at the end of the session. No other participant
will know how much you earned. All monetary amounts in the experiment will be
given in ECU (experimental currency units). At the end, all earned ECUs will be
converted into Euro using the following exchange rate:
10.000 ECU = 1 euro
Procedure of the experiment
The experiment consists of 2 parts with 12 rounds each. In each part you will
make decisions at three stages. One stage consists of four rounds. You receive the
instructions for the second part after finishing the 12 rounds of part 1.
At the end of the experiment, 5 rounds of each part will be randomly selected to
determine your payment. You will receive the sum of your payoffs you have earned
in 10 rounds. Your total payment will be comprised of the participation fee of 15
Euro and the amounts you earned in the 10 randomly selected rounds.
If you suffer a loss in the 10 selected rounds, you can pay it in cash or balance
it by completing additional tasks at the end of the experiment. Please note that
these additional tasks can only be used to compensate for possible losses, but not to
increase your earnings. Additionally, you will receive a payment for one task from
the questionnaire part. Hence, you will receive the participation fee and payment
for the questionnaire part in any case.
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Introduction
In this experiment you take the role of a manager in a company. You decide how
many units of a good your company should produce. This amount specifies the
capacity of your company. Afterwards, you choose the selling price for the pro-
duced good. Your company has a competing company which produces the same
good. You compete against the other company in four rounds. Afterwards, another
competitor will be randomly assigned to you. You will not be informed about the
other manager’s identity.
In each round of the experiment, you will first make decisions about the capacity,
followed by decisions about the price. At the beginning of each round, you and the
company you are competing with will decide about your capacity simultaneously
(SC: one after another) and independently of each other. The capacity corresponds
to the amount of goods that your company is planning to produce in this round.
Every capacity unit costs a fixed amount. (CS: Your capacity determines how much
you can sell in one round without additional costs. If you have to sell more than
your capacity, every additional unit has much higher fixed costs.) After your capa-
city decision, you will be informed about the capacity decision of your competing
company. (SC: At the beginning of each stage, it will be decided by choice which
company determines its capacity first. The other company will be informed about
this decision before making its own). Afterwards, both companies choose their sell-
ing price for their good at the same time. The company with the lower price gets
the chance to sell its produced amount first. The company with the higher price
can sell something only if the preferred company has produced too little to sell
something to every interested costumer. (CS: The company with the lower price
must sell the requested amount for the given price. The company with the higher
price does not sell anything.) If the prices are equal, the costumers are distributed
to both companies equally (if the number of costumers is odd, it will be rounded
to the next higher even number). In any case, both companies have to pay their
production costs. This holds even if they have not sold anything.
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Definition of the experiment - Part 1
The experiment consists of two parts which are divided into three stages. At the
beginning of each stage, the groups of two companies are assigned by chance and
each time anew. (Additionally, the computer chooses which company will make its
decision first.)
One stage consists of four rounds, in which you interact with the same competing
company. The procedure is as follows:
1. Both companies choose a capacity between 0 and 100 at the same time. The
costs are 80 ECU for each capacity unit. (SC: the randomly selected company
chooses a capacity between 0 and 100. The capacity decision is announced.
Afterwards, the other company chooses its capacity. For both companies the
costs are 80 ECU for each capacity unit.)
2. The capacity decisions are announced. (SC: The capacity decision of the other
company is announced).
3. Both companies choose a price between 0 and 200 for the produced good at
the same time.
4. The chosen prices are announced, the produced goods are sold and both com-
panies come to know their earnings or losses as well as the ones of the other
company.
The demand of your produced good complies with your chosen price: The more
expensive the good, the less it is bought.
The number of costumers for the produced good is computed by the software and
depends on price p. It equals the amount 200-p. This means that the number of
costumers declines with a rising price.
Your payment is composed of your revenues minus your production costs. For every
sold good you receive the chosen price and pay production costs for every produced
unit. The amount you sell depends on whether your price is smaller, higher or equal
to the price of the other company in your group:
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a) Your price is lower.
In this case you first get the chance to sell your produced amount. For every unit
sold you receive your price p. If an amount M is requested, you earn p*M. From
this you have to subtract the production costs of 80 ECU per produced unit. If the
requested amount M exceeds your capacity, the other company can sell something
at its higher price. This will work if interested customers remain that are ready to
pay the higher price. (CS: You have to sell a good to every costumer. For every sold
unit you receive your price p. If an amount M is demanded, you earn p*M. From
this you have to subtract the production costs. If the requested amount M exceeds
your capacity, you have to pay 120 ECU for each unit produced above capacity. )
b) Your price is higher.
In this case, you only sell something if the other company has produced too little.
If there are remaining customers who are ready to buy at the higher price, they will
buy from you. For every unit sold you receive the chosen price. Even if you sell
nothing or less than you have produced you have to pay all the production costs
at the amount of 80*your capacity. (CS: You do not sell anything, but have to pay
the production costs that correspond to 80*your capacity.)
c) Both prices are equal.
In this case both companies can each sell to one half of the costumers. Even if you
sell less than you have produced you have to pay all the production costs. (CS:
In this case, both companies each have to sell to one half of the costumers. If this
amount does not exceed their capacity, costs in the amount of 80 ECU arise for
each produced unit. If this amount exceeds their capacity, they have to pay 120
ECU for each unit produced above capacity.)
Therefore, your payment can be summarized as follows:
Your price*sold amount - 80*your capacity
Please note that the production costs of 80*your capacity also arise even if you sell
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nothing or less than you produced in one round. (CS: Please note that the amount
sold can be 0 and the fixed costs rise from 80 to 120 ECU if the sold amount exceeds
your capacity.)
You will receive instructions for part 2 at the end of stage 1.
Before part 1 of the experiment begins, we ask you to answer a few control questions
to help you understand the rules of the experiment. This is followed by one practice
round, so that you can become familiar with the structure of the experiment. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand.
Instructions for part 2
Part 2 also consists of three stages. At the beginning of each stage, the groups of
two companies are chosen randomly. (SC: The computer will also decide randomly
which company decides first about its capacity.)
Afterwards, there will be four rounds in each stage. The process of these rounds
only differs from the rounds in part 1 insofar that the companies can tell the other
company the price they will determine before choosing a price. This statement is
not binding, e.g., the actual decision can be different from the price which was told.
If you have any questions about part 2, please raise your hand.
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